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Lilly v. Virginia: A Chance 
To Reconceptualize The 
Confrontation Right 
by Richard D. Friedman 
University of Michigan Law School 
In Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court once again 
has the opportunity to grapple with the meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmel).t. The 
basic facts of Lilly are simple, for they present the age-
old problem of accomplice confessions. Three men, 
Gary Barker and Ben and Mark Lilly, went on a crime 
spree, during which one of them shot to death a young 
man they had robbed and kidnaped. Ben Lilly was 
charged with being the triggerman, and Barker 
testified to that effect at Ben's trial. Mark did not 
testify. But Mark had made a statement to the police 
shortly after the trio was apprehended, and he also 
identified his brother Ben as the triggerman. Mark's 
statement was introduced over Ben's objection. Ben 
was convicted. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld 
the conviction, treating Mark's statement as a 
declaration against penal interest, 499 S.E.2d 522 
(1998), and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The case was argued on March 29, 1999. 
If the Court decides to treat the case within the 
framework it has attempted to set up for 
Confrontation cases, it would ask whether Mark's 
statement fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 
(It seems fairly clear that Mark has been treated as 
being unavailable; whether either party could have 
induced him to testify raises interesting questions that 
the Court will probably not touch.) There seems to be 
little doubt that the hearsay exception for declarations 
against interest is firmly rooted, and the Virginia 
courts did bring the statement within their version of 
the exception. Moreover, by virtue of the broad 
adoption of codifications based on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, most American jurisdictions now treat 
declarations against penal interest as within the 
exception. But, as Lilly argues, most American 
jurisdictions refuse to use this line of reasoning to 
admit accomplice confessions. Indeed, in Williamson v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), in a relatively 
narrow reading of the exception for declarations 
against penal interest, refused to apply the exception 
to nonself-inculpatory statements, even if they are 
made within broader narrative that is generally 
self-inculpatory; it would not be surprising if the Court 
constitutionalizes that rule, and holds that Mark's 
statement identifying Ben as the triggerman was not 
against interest. But a sound framework for such a 
decision is difficult to articulate: Are the Supreme 
Court's interpretations of the Federal Rules now to be 
the determinant of what is "firmly rooted," and so of 
what the Confrontation Clause will tolerate? Or, by 
contrast, should a state be allowed to satisfy the 
Clause simply by putting a plausible tag of some well 
recognized exception on a statement? Alternatively, 
the Court could follow the bare majority in Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and hold that simply 
treating the statement as a declaration against penal 
interest "defines too large a class for meaningf\tl 
Confrontation Clause analysis". But if the statement 
should be treated in terms of a subcategory, "as 
involving a confession by an accomplice which 
incriminates a criminal defendant," then what 
becomes of the idea that falling within a firmly rooted 
hearsay ex..;eption is er1ough to take a statement out of 
the Confrontation bar? 
In my view, the problem is that the Court has 
defined the confrontation right in terms of, and so 
made it dependent upon, ordinary hearsay law. The 
Court should attempt to define the right in terms 
independent of hearsay law. In an amicus brief filed 
on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union (and 
available through www.aclu.org), Margaret Berger and 
I have offered some approaches by which this could be 
done. The brief got some apparently favorable 
attention at oral argument, both from the bench and 
from Lilly's counsel. We will soon see whether the 
Court is yet willing to acknowledge that its 
Confrontation Clause decisions, by confounding a 
fundamental right that reached full flower in the 
Anglo-American legal system with the bog of hearsay 
law, have given little guidance to lower courts or 
protection to defendants, and have retarded the 
liberalization of hearsay law in civil cases and other 
situations where the confrontation right is not at 
stake. 
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